Is There Neural Evidence for an Evidence Accumulation Process in Memory Decisions? by Marieke K. van Vugt et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 08 March 2016
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00093
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 93
Edited by:
Carol Seger,
Colorado State University, USA
Reviewed by:
Elisabeth Jeannette Ploran,
Hofstra University, USA
Erik James Peterson,
University of California, San Diego,
USA
*Correspondence:
Marieke K. van Vugt
m.k.van.vugt@rug.nl
Received: 19 October 2015
Accepted: 22 February 2016
Published: 08 March 2016
Citation:
van Vugt MK, Beulen MA and
Taatgen NA (2016) Is There Neural
Evidence for an Evidence
Accumulation Process in Memory
Decisions?
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 10:93.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00093
Is There Neural Evidence for an
Evidence Accumulation Process in
Memory Decisions?
Marieke K. van Vugt *, Marijke A. Beulen and Niels A. Taatgen
Cognitive Modeling Group, Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Engineering, University of Groningen, Groningen,
Netherlands
Models of evidence accumulation have been very successful at describing human
decision making behavior. Recent years have also seen the first reports of neural
correlates of this accumulation process. However, these studies have mostly focused
on perceptual decision making tasks, ignoring the role of additional cognitive processes
like memory retrieval that are crucial in real-world decisions. In this study, we tried to find a
neural signature of evidence accumulation during a recognition memory task. To do this,
we applied a method we have successfully used to localize evidence accumulation in
scalp EEG during a perceptual decision making task. This time, however, we applied it to
intracranial EEG recordings, which provide a much higher spatial resolution. We identified
several brain areas where activity ramps up over time, but these neural patterns do not
appear to be modulated by behavioral variables such as the amount of available evidence
or response time. This casts doubt on the idea of evidence accumulation as a general
decision-making mechanism underlying different types of decisions.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Probably the most well-studied component of decisions is the process of evidence
accumulation (Heekeren et al., 2008). Mathematical models that describe this evidence
accumulation process, e.g., the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978), the linear ballistic
accumulator (Brown and Heathcote, 2008), and leaky competing accumulators (Usher and
McClelland, 2001) have been able to explain a wealth of behavioral data. Moreover, these models
are increasingly used to elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying decision making. However,
many of these studies have focused solely on simple perceptual decision making tasks, ignoring the
fact that many real-life decisions and decision tasks also call for the retrieval of information from
memory or other sources. Here we aim to extend this growing body of literature by looking at an
accumulation process which uses information from memory in addition to perceptual sources.
To do this, we use a method which has previously allowed us to find a signature of evidence
accumulation in scalp EEG during a perceptual decision making task (random dot motion) (van
Vugt et al., 2012). We apply this method to two-alternative forced-choice decisions in a recognition
memory task.
Our approach is to select all brain areas where activity is roughly consistent with the time course
of evidence accumulation, and then to apply further criteria to pinpoint each area’s specific role in
the process. Moreover, the results we present were obtained using intracranial EEG (iEEG), which
has much better spatial resolution than conventional scalp EEG, combined with excellent temporal
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resolution (Jacobs and Kahana, 2010). However, iEEG has
not previously been used to study the dynamics of evidence
accumulation.
1.1. Modeling Evidence Accumulation
Accumulator models of decision making (Ditterich, 2010)
assume that to make a decision, evidence is accumulated
slowly over time, until the accumulated evidence reaches the
threshold corresponding to a particular response, at which
point the corresponding option is chosen. Several different
implementations of such an evidence accumulation process have
been conceived, but here we will focus on the Ratcliff Diffusion
Model (DDM), which is widely used in the literature. While the
recent neuroscience literature has focused on perceptual decision
making, it is interesting to note that the DDMwas originally used
to model a recognition memory task (Ratcliff, 1978).
The DDM assumes that response time is determined by the
time it takes the random walk process to reach a decision
threshold, plus a fixed non-decision time reflecting perceptual
processing of stimuli and preparation of a motor response. The
speed with which the decision variable moves toward one of
the boundaries, is influenced by the ambiguity of the evidence
and quality of attention: stronger evidence and more focused
attention will lead to a faster accumulation of evidence in favor
of one particular option and thus to a faster decision. The height
of the decision threshold reflects response caution or speed-
accuracy trade-off. We will use all of these elements of the model
as further criteria to narrow down the set of candidate neural
accumulators.
1.2. Neural Correlates of Evidence
Accumulation
As reviewed by Heekeren et al. (2008), there is a consensus
that for perceptual decision making, stimulus information is
processed in sensory areas, then integrated or accumulated
in parietal and frontal areas, and subsequently transmitted to
effector areas to produce the desired responses. Indeed, single-
unit studies in monkeys have found patterns of firing rate
qualitatively consistent with evidence accumulation (Shadlen and
Newsome, 2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Churchland et al.,
2011) in the lateral intraparietal area. Subsequent studies have
shown similar neural patterns in the superior colliculus (Horwitz
and Newsome, 2001), frontal eye field (Cohen et al., 2009; Purcell
et al., 2010), caudate (Ding and Gold, 2010), and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (Kim and Shadlen, 1999).
Neuroimaging studies in humans, which, unlike single-unit
studies, are not limited to a single brain area, have replicated
accumulation-like patterns for different types of sensory
information in various frontal and parietal areas (e.g., Heekeren
et al., 2006; Ploran et al., 2007; de Lange et al., 2010).
While the effects observed in functional magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) were at best fairly indirect, due to the limited
temporal resolution of this method, electrophysiological and
magnetoencephalographic studies examining brain oscillations
have also pointed at patterns that resemble those hypothesized
by evidence accumulation models (e.g., Donner et al., 2009;
van Vugt et al., 2012). Brain oscillations are widely believed to
play an important role in our cognitive functioning (Buzsáki,
2006). During complex tasks that require the participation of
several different, spatially separated brain areas, it is believed
that synchronized oscillatory activity is what allows these
neuronal populations to communicate and coordinate their
functioning (Fries, 2005). In relation to evidence accumulation,
studies making use of magnetoencephalography (MEG) have
implicated 12–36 Hz beta and 64–100 Hz gamma in primarily
effector regions (such as primary motor cortex) in this
process (Donner et al., 2009). In contrast, EEG studies have
implicated 4–9 Hz theta oscillations, which are also involved
in more general decisional processes (Cavanagh et al., 2010;
Womelsdorf et al., 2010), in evidence accumulation (van Vugt
et al., 2012; Werkle-Bergner et al., 2014).
Importantly, all of the above-mentioned studies focus only
on simple perceptual decisions, for which sensory input is often
one-dimensional and administered to participants at a constant
rate. The addition of a memory component in our task means
that the neural implementation of evidence accumulation may
be different than what was observed in perceptual studies. There
have been a few studies that use sequentially presented cues
containing information about an upcoming decision, where
subjects need to remember a running average of the cues they
have seen thus far. This has been done in both humans (Gluth
et al., 2013) and monkeys (Kira et al., 2015). However, the
role of memory in these tasks is very limited and both studies
only look at one of the brain areas that may play a role in
evidence accumulation. As a result, our knowledge of where this
process takes place in a memory task is far from complete. It
is possible that accumulation still takes place in the same brain
areas as during a perceptual task, but with a slightly different time
course, due to the additional time needed for memory retrieval.
Alternatively, it is possible that additional or even different brain
areas are now involved in the accumulation process. For this
reason, we do not focus our analysis on any particular region of
interest a priori, but look for correlates of evidence accumulation
across the entire brain. Similarly, we do not focus on a single band
of oscillatory activity but focus on all frequencies.
To preview our results, even with this data-driven approach,
we were unable to find any signal that fits theoretical predictions
for how an accumulator would behave. This raises the question
whether evidence accumulation actually plays a role in more
complex, memory-based decision tasks like the one used here,
or if it does, how it is implemented in the brain. Our analysis
assumes that the accumulation process is monotonic and linear,
but maybe for this particular task, that is not a correct
representation.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Task
The task our participants performed used the Sternberg working
memory paradigm (Sternberg, 1966) with faces and letters as
stimuli. After fixation (1000–1075 ms, jittered), participants saw
a sequence of 1–4 items for 700–775 ms each, separated by 275–
350 ms interstimulus intervals. They remembered these items for
a 3000–3300ms retention period. After this interval, a probe item
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appeared and subjects were asked to judge whether this item was
part of the memory set (a target) or not (a lure). Subsequently,
the participants received accuracy feedback and pressed a key to
advance to the next trial. The durations of stimulus presentations
and intervals were jittered to avoid spurious correlations between
ongoing brain activity and the timing of task events.
The memory sets participants studied consisted of either
synthetic faces (see van Vugt et al., 2010) or consonants. Trials
of each type were presented in blocks of 30 trials, with the
order of blocks randomized across participants. For the current
analysis, trials of both stimulus conditions (faces and letters)
were combined into one large dataset. Only correctly answered
trials with reaction times up to 2500ms were used for subsequent
analysis.
In addition to varying study list length, the amount of decision
evidence in face trials was further manipulated by systematically
varying the similarity between faces in the memory set and the
probe item. More precisely, the amount of decision evidence
depends on summed similarity (Nosofsky, 1991). Summed
similarity is the sum of the similarity values between the probe
item and each of the items in the memory set. The higher the
sum of these similarities, the more familiar a probe item feels,
and consequently, the larger the probability it will be endorsed
as a target. This means that for target trials, a high summed
similarity corresponds to an easy trial with strong evidence for
the correct decision. For lures, a higher summed similarity value
corresponds to a more difficult trial.
2.2. Participants
The participants in this study were sixteen neurosurgical
patients (ages 15–58; six female) who underwent surgery for
pharmacologically intractable epilepsy. Patients had arrays of
subdural and/or depth electrodes implanted to localize seizure
onset and map cognitive functions prior to surgery. Electrode
locations were based solely on medical considerations. Previous
publications have reported on the neural correlates of memory
processes in these data (van Vugt et al., 2009, 2010).
Patients were recruited from Brigham and Women’s Hospital
in Boston, the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania in
Philadelphia, and Universitäts Klinikum Freiburg in Germany,
and the research protocol was approved by the appropriate
institutional review boards at each hospital: the Partners Human
Research Committee in Boston, the University of Pennsylvania
Office of Regulatory Affairs Institutional Review Board and
the Ethik-Komission der Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg,
respectively. Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants. In the case of minors, written consent was given by
both the patient and their parents or custodians.
2.3. Intracranial EEG Recordings
The intracranial EEG data were recorded by the clinical EEG
system, and the task was administered by a separate laptop
running the recognition memory experiment. We synchronized
the testing and recording computers using optical pulses. By
lining up these pulses we could determine the timing of events
with a precision of<4 ms.
The locations of implanted electrodes were determined
from co-registered postoperative computed tomographies
and preoperative MRI or from postoperative MRIs, and
converted into MNI coordinates. Depth electrodes in the
hippocampus were localized manually by clinicians by inspection
of postoperative MRIs. Table S1 lists the number of electrodes
located in each different Brodmann area, as well as the number
of participants contributing these electrodes to each area.
2.4. Analysis of Intracranial EEG Data
The local field potential at each electrode was amplified and
digitally recorded at sampling rates between 250 and 1024 Hz.
Subsequently, line noise was removed using a Butterworth notch
filter at 48–52 or 58–62 Hz, depending on the continent where
data were recorded. Next, a series of artifact detection steps were
performed on the data. This was done separately for each trial,
such that all electrodes showing an artifact during a specific trial
were excluded from later analysis for that trial.
The artifact detection process consisted of three steps. First,
we normalized the amplitude of the local field potentials across
all electrodes and trials, and for each trial, excluded all electrodes
whose amplitude was more than four standard deviations
removed from the mean at any point during the trial. Second,
we excluded all electrodes in trials where their kurtosis exceeded
a threshold of 4.5 (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). Finally, we
excluded electrodes from trials where their variance exceeded
1.75 standard deviations above the population mean. These
thresholds were determined empirically by visually identifying
artifacts in data from a subset of participants and then finding the
threshold values that optimize the number of correctly removed
artifacts relative to the number of false alarms (defined as trials
which the algorithm identified as artifacts while they were in fact
usable). The resulting thresholds were then applied uniformly to
the data of all participants.
For patients who participated in more than one recording
session, the artifact detection process was performed separately
for each session, to make sure our measures were not influenced
by changes in the recording equipment between sessions.
After performing these three steps, all trials where more than
50% of electrodes showed any of the three possible artifacts,
were removed from further analysis for all electrodes. Only
participants who had at least 20 correctly answered letter- and
20 correctly answered face trials after artifact removal, were
included in the rest of the analysis. This led to the removal of four
participants, so all further analyses were performed on data from
the 12 remaining participants. Similarly, electrodes that showed
an artifact on more than 50% of trials in a particular recording
session were removed from the dataset for that session. This led
to the removal of an average of 8.08% of channels for the 12
participants included in our final analysis (SEM= 2.59%).
For each trial of the task, we calculated normalized oscillatory
power using the Morlet wavelet transform with a width of 5.
Normalization involved dividing each sample by the average and
standard deviation across the 300-ms pre-trial baseline periods.
We computed power at 53 frequencies, logarithmically spaced
between 1 and 100 Hz. These were then divided into six different
frequency bands: 2–4 Hz delta, 4–9 Hz theta, 9–14Hz alpha,
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14–28 Hz beta, 28–48 Hz low gamma, and 48–90 Hz high
gamma (van Vugt et al., 2010). Datasets with very high sampling
frequencies were downsampled to 250 Hz prior to wavelet
transform. Afterwards, all wavelet-transformed time series were
downsampled again to 50 Hz to give all participants’ datasets
the same sampling rate and to reduce the computational burden.
The same was done with the raw EEG signal (van Vugt et al.,
2012).
2.5. Patterns of Brain Activity
Theories about evidence accumulation predict a specific pattern
of activity to be present in the brain during decision making. We
translated this predicted pattern of activity into a regressor and
tested how well that could predict the brain activity we recorded
(i.e., the amplitude of the raw EEG and the amplitude of wavelet-
transformed EEG in different frequency bands). We followed the
same procedure that was used in our previous study of scalp EEG
activity during a perceptual decision making task (van Vugt et al.,
2012). In the first step of our analysis, we used linear regression to
find the extent to which the EEG signal at each electrode matched
the predicted patterns.
Specifically, a neural correlate of evidence accumulation
would be a type of activity that starts at zero when the probe
stimulus is shown and decision evidence first becomes available,
gradually keeps building up until a decision is made and then
drops down to a baseline level again. We simulated this as
“ramps” that build up from 0 to 1 over the duration of each
decision period (the interval from the onset of the probe stimulus
until the response), and are 0 at all other times. The lengths
of these ramps match the durations of each trial that subjects
actually performed (i.e., their individual reaction times). An
example is shown in Figure 1.
The DDM predicts that a portion of the time between the
onset of the probe and the response is taken up by the non-
decision time, which reflects perceptual and motor delays. To
account for this, the durations of each participant’s ramps were
adjusted for their individual non-decision time as estimated
by the Robust EZ package for R (Wagenmakers et al., 2008).
This was done so that half of the non-decision time comes
before the onset of the ramp, reflecting non-decision processes
that take place before the start of evidence accumulation (e.g.,
stimulus processing), and the other half after the ramp has
returned to baseline, reflecting non-decision processes between
accumulation and response execution.
To see where in the brain our ramping pattern is the best
predictor of activity during decision periods, we contrasted
the ramps to two alternative patterns of activity that are not
consistent with evidence accumulation (see also Figure 1). In
the first alternative, activity increases sharply at the beginning
of the decision period and them slowly declines back to
baseline, forming a downward ramp1. The second alternative is a
1Note that this is not the same as a vertically flipped ramp. The crucial difference
is that the ramp, as the DDM predicts, slowly moves away from baseline from the
moment when decision evidence becomes available. For the downramp, on the
other hand, there is a sudden break from baseline at the beginning of the decision
interval, not consistent with the gradual nature of the evidence accumulation
process as predicted by the DDM. At the end of the accumulation process, the
FIGURE 1 | (A) Example time courses of one electrode’s theta activity and the
matching ramp, downramp, and boxcar regressors for three consecutive trials.
(B) Example time courses of “random” ramp, downramp and boxcar
regressors: made using randomly shuffled reaction times. Note that in this
case, onset and offset of the ramp no longer correspond to “probe” and
“response,” respectively. Dotted colored lines show time course of regressors
before correction for non-decision time. Vertical lines indicate borders between
real task trials.
“boxcar” pattern: a constant level of increased activity during the
entire decision period, corresponding, for example, to a generic
“attention on” state, which also returns to baseline when the
decision is made (e.g., Raghavachari et al., 2001). To model this
departure from and return to baseline as well, all regressors also
contain 300 ms of a signal with zero amplitude before and after
the decision interval.
The dependent variable in our regression analysis consists of
the ampitude of oscillatory power in each of the seven frequency
bands, recorded during the decision period of each trial, with
a 300 ms buffer of extra-trial time on each side. For each
electrode, the decision intervals from all the trials the participant
performed were combined into one long dependent variable that
ramp sharply drops back to baseline, reflecting the crossing of a decision threshold
which ends the accumulation process immediately, while the downramp shows a
very gradual return to baseline.
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exactly matches the length of the regressors for that participant
(see Figure 1A, top, for illustration). Trials containing artifacts
were excluded from these features, as well as the corresponding
regressors.
To compare the oscillatory frequency bands, we made seven
separate features for each electrode, containing the time courses
of oscillatory activity in each of the frequency bands and of
the raw EEG amplitude. Each of these features was analyzed
separately in regression analyses with each of the three regressors.
For the next step in our analysis, we grouped all electrodes
according to the Brodmann area in which they were located,
to determine which brain areas in particular show activity
representative of evidence accumulation. In total, we recorded
electrodes from 34 different brain areas. For our statistical
analysis, we only included brain areas for which we had at least
10 electrodes, to avoid spurious conclusions based on too little
data. This led to the inclusion of 25 Brodmann areas (see Table
S1). Figure 2 shows the locations of all 852 electrodes included in
our final analysis.
2.6. Assessing Significance with Random
Regressors
As a first investigation of whether the ramping pattern our model
predicts is visible in the brain when a decision is made, we
used a canonical correlation analysis (CCA, van Vugt et al.,
2012). The benefit of this method is that it tells us to what
extent ramp-like activity is present in the activity of all electrodes
combined, instead of limiting the search to a single electrode at
a time (similar reasoning is used in MVPA for fMRI data, see
e.g., Norman et al., 2006). This leaves room for the possibility
that accumulation takes place in a combination of different brain
areas at different times during the decision process. The CCA
analysis gives a single value for the “fit” of each regressor to
certain frequencies of activity across the entire brain. This allows
us to see whether there is any neural pattern that shows the
predicted ramping activity.
Specifically, the CCA analysis looks for correlations between
two sets of variables by identifying linear combinations of
the variables in one set that optimally predict (combinations
of) variables in the other set. In our case, a set of independent
variables is formed by all the time courses of a certain type
of activity, e.g., the features containing the theta activity of all
electrodes. The analysis makes a weighted linear combination of
all electrodes’ time courses, so that if a brain area is not involved
in evidence accumulation at all and consequently does not show
ramp-like activity, it is possible that electrodes overlying that area
receive a low weight and contribute little to the final correlation.
In other words, CCA does not assume or require that the entire
brain is involved, but it finds the relevant brain areas in a
data-driven way.
As in our previous study, we performed a separate CCA
for each regressor (upramp, downramp, and boxcar). The
main outcome of the CCA, in this case, is the strength of
the resulting overall correlation. Since it was not possible to
combine electrodes across participants, as their locations are not
standardized like in scalp EEG, we performed the CCA for each
participant separately and then Fisher-transformed and averaged
the resulting canonical correlations within each Brodmann area
such that every participant contributed equally.
To assess significance of these canonical correlations, and to
ensure that the ramping we observed was not a statistical artifact,
we performed a permutation analysis in which the durations
of the trials in our regressors were randomly rearranged so
they no longer started and ended with the decision periods in
the EEG data (see Figure 1B). Then, the canonical correlation
with the EEG data was obtained for these rearranged regressors.
This procedure was repeated 1000 times for each regressor type,
frequency band and participant, and the resulting correlations
were then averaged across participants. The correlation between
the “real” ramp regressor and our EEG data was then compared
to this distribution of correlations obtained without temporal
alignment. Significant correlations should exceed the correlations
derived from random data.
2.7. Linear Mixed Effects Model to Find
Accumulator Location
After testing whether there was any ramp-like activity in the brain
in general, we wanted to see in more detail where this activity was
taking place. For this, we used a linear mixed effects model (LME-
model; Pinheiro and Bates, 2009). This modeling technique takes
into account the hierarchical nature of the data (where electrodes
are nested within participants), and can deal with imbalances in
the data (e.g., not all Brodmann areas contain electrodes from
all participants). The mixed effects models included the fixed
effects of frequency band, regressor type and brain area, as well as
random effects of subject and individual electrode. This allowed
us to examine what areas and frequencies show a larger ramping
effect than average, without having to perform many individual
FIGURE 2 | Locations of all cortical electrodes in our dataset.
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comparisons. The LME-model was implemented using the lmer
function of the lme4 package (Baayen et al., 2008) in the statistical
software R.
The dependent variable in our LME model were simple linear
regression of each electrode’s seven features against each of
the three regressors. We then asked what Brodmann areas and
frequency bands the ramp regressor is a significantly better (i.e.,
higher regression slope) than average fit to the EEG data.
Since we were only interested in whether a specific frequency
band in a brain area was correlated with the ramp regressor
more than average, we only included interactions of brain area
and frequency band in the model. This means that the LME-
model contains a single fixed-effect independent variable: the
interaction term of brain area and frequency band (see the
equation below). In addition, since there was no clear reference
level for either factor, we removed the intercept. Finally, model
comparisons showed that the best fitting model included random
intercepts for individual participants and electrodes. This led to a
model described by the following equation:
corr = −1+ β1i,jbandi × areaj + β2subjr + β3elecr (1)
where corr= Fisher-transformed, centered correlation coefficient
for each electrode at each frequency band; band = frequency
band; area = Brodmann area; subj = participant number; elec =
unique (across participants) electrode number; β = fitted model
coefficients.
Before being entered into the analysis, the correlation
coefficients were first Fisher-transformed, and then centered
by subtracting the mean of all correlation coefficients. As a
result, the model coefficient for each band-area pair refers to
the deviation of that pair’s correlation with the ramp regressor
from the mean of all tested correlations. We then tested which of
these coefficients significantly differed from zero using the t-test
implemented in the cftest function of the multcomp (Hothorn
et al., 2008) package in R. This function tests whether model
coefficients are different from zero, while controlling for multiple
comparisons.
After identifying the brain area and frequency band pairs that
best match the ramp regressor, we ran separate LME-models
within each of them to compare the fit of the ramp regressor
to that of the downramp and boxcar regressors. Each of these
models is described by the following equation:
corr = β0 + β1iregri + β2subjr + β3elecr (2)
where corr= Fisher-transformed, centered correlation coefficient
for each electrode and regressor at each frequency band; regr =
regressor type; subj = participant number; elec = unique (across
participants) electrode number; β = fitted model coefficients.
The resulting p-values were corrected for multiple
comparisons using a false discovery rate (FDR) procedure.
In contrast to methods like Bonferroni correction, which are
very conservative for large numbers of comparisons, the FDR
procedure works by controlling the total proportion of false
positives in a complete set of comparisons.
After this correction, we selected the area and band
combinations for which the ramp regressor provided at least
an equally good fit as the other two patterns (boxcar and
downramp).
2.8. Event-Related Averages to Test for
More Specific Accumulator Properties
All combinations of brain areas and frequency bands where the
ramp regressor showed an above-average fit in the LME-model
analysis, were marked as candidates for evidence accumulation.
We then tested if each of these areas and bands fulfilled further
theoretical predictions for accumulators. This was done by
inspecting the time courses of their activity during the decision
period.
Since there were large differences in reaction times between
trials, even after grouping them into bins, event-related averages
within each reaction time bin were vincentized to obtain a
more reliable time course (Workman and Adams, 1950). In this
method, each trial is resampled to the same number of samples,
in this case the median reaction time in each bin. Short trials
are stretched, while long trials are compacted. The benefit of
this method is that it ensures that processes happening during
a specific portion of each trial are not obscured by averaging
over trials of very different lengths. Processes that take a fixed
amount of time on each trial, like initial stimulus processing or
response preparation, may become over- or underrepresented
in the vincentized version of a trial. However, given that we
have relatively long reaction times of which these non-decision
processes form a relatively short fraction, and we are most
interested in what happens in between, we believe this is not a
problem.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Behavioral Results
We first examined behavioral performance in the delayed
recognition task (Figure 3). Mean accuracy was 81.0% (SEM =
1.7% ) for letters and faces combined; mean reaction time was
1512 ms (SEM = 273 ms). Performance was slightly better on
trials with letters than with faces [lower RT: t(11) = −3.1049, p =
0.01; higher accuracy: t(11) = 11.9158, p < 0.001]. Nevertheless,
in subsequent analyses, we combined face and letter trials because
according to the theory, a similar evidence accumulation process
should occur for both types of stimuli.
The only case where we did not combine face and letter
trials is the comparison between trials of low and high summed
similarity. Summed similarity is the sum of the amount of
similarity between the probe stimulus and each of the list
stimuli. Previous work has shown that this is a measure of
task difficulty (Nosofsky, 1991; Kahana and Sekuler, 2002). Note
that this manipulation only applies to face trials, for which
similarity distances were systematicallymanipulated. As expected
(Figure 4), higher levels of decision evidence were associated
with higher accuracy and faster response times, except for the
lowest (most difficult) level, where participantsmay have resorted
to guessing.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 March 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 93
van Vugt et al. Accumulation during Memory Decisions?
FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy (A) and reaction times (B) for faces, letters, and the average of the two. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.
FIGURE 4 | Mean accuracy (A) and reaction times (B) separated by decision evidence as indexed by summed similarity. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean.
As described in Materials and Methods above, we estimated
each participant’s non-decision time using the Robust EZ
package (Wagenmakers et al., 2008). The mean estimated
non-decision time was 0.63 s, with a standard deviation
of 0.17 s.
3.2. Ramp-Like Activity in the Brain
To see if there was any ramp-like activity in the brain that
was significantly time-locked to our task, we performed a
canonical correlation of each regressor against the activity of
all electrodes. Figure 5 shows that the correlation of our task-
timed ramp regressor is above 99% of the distribution of
correlations obtained with randomized timing in all frequency
bands. The highest correlations are observed in the delta and
theta bands, as well as for the raw EEG signal. The same,
however, is true for the downramp and boxcar regressors. In
other words, our ramp regressor does not seem to describe
overall brain activity during decision periods better than the
two alternative patterns. However, this does not mean that all
three regressors are associated with the same neural patterns.
It is very well possible that ramp-like and boxcar-like activity
take place simultaneously in different parts of the brain. To
disentangle timing from localization of ramp-like and boxcar-
like activity, we performed regressions in individual Brodmann
areas.
3.3. Brodmann Areas that Show a Ramping
Pattern
To examine where in the brain the ramp-like and boxcar-like
activity demonstrated by the previous analysis take place, we
used a linear mixed effects (LME) model to find which areas and
frequency bands activity was more ramp-like than boxcar-like.
As shown in Table 1, four regions show significant ramping
in low frequency bands: Brodmann areas 1, 2, 3, & 5
(somatosensory cortex), 9 (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), and 37
(occipitotemporal cortex; inferior temporal gyrus and fusiform
gyrus) in the 2–4 Hz delta band, and Brodmann areas 19
(occipital cortex; visual association cortex) and 37 in the 4–9 Hz
theta band. The correlation (averaged over patients) of the three
regressors with delta and theta activity in each brain area is shown
in Figure 6. We are looking for areas that show the ramping
pattern (blue line) more than other areas, but also at least as
clearly as the two alternative patterns. The figure demonstrates
that our five areas satisfy this criterion.
In addition to these five area–band pairs, there were 11 pairs
where the correlation with the downramp regressor did not
significantly differ from that with the ramp regressor. Because
we were specifically interested in areas that showed ramp-like
activity and did not show a downramp-like pattern of activity,
we did not include these areas in our analysis. We report these
pairs in Table S2. There were no brain areas where the ramp
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FIGURE 5 | Mean canonical correlation between each regressor and
the time course of whole-brain EEG/oscillatory power. White dots
indicate 99th percentile of correlations obtained from regressors with
randomized timing (i.e., they represent the chance level of each correlation).
TABLE 1 | Brodmann areas and frequency bands which show significantly
higher correlations with the ramp regressor than with the other
regressors.
Brain area Frequency band Estimate p-value
BA1,2,3,5 delta (2–4 Hz) 0.033 1.21e-05
BA9 delta (2–4 Hz) 0.025 7.13e-05
BA19 theta (4–9 Hz) 0.110 <2e-16
BA37 delta (2–4 Hz) 0.063 <2e-16
BA37 theta (4–9 Hz) 0.109 <2e-16
Estimate shows the deviation of the correlation with the ramp regressor from the grand
mean. BA, Brodmann area; BA1,2,3,5, somatosensory cortex; BA9, prefrontal cortex;
BA19, occipital cortex; BA37, occipitotemporal cortex. P-values were obtained from
multiple-comparisons-corrected t-tests.
regressor fitted the neural data significantly better than the boxcar
regressor. Even though this is some reason for worry about the
areas being true accumulators, we still proceed to inspect the time
courses to check whether our candidates are true accumulators.
To preview our results, these suggested that in fact there was little
support for that idea.
3.4. Time Courses of Activity
Figure 7 shows average vincentized time courses of delta and
theta power in the areas that showed significant ramp-like activity
in these bands (according to Table 1). Since some of these areas
respond very differently to trials with faces or letters as stimuli,
these two categories are shown separately.
Some areas show a small positive peak at stimulus onset, but
after that, power gradually moves away from the baseline level
(zero) in all areas. The power then returns to baseline around
the response. This is consistent with the behavior expected from
a neural evidence accumulator. However, the ramping activity
in all areas and frequency bands except prefrontal (BA9) delta
goes downward rather than upward from baseline, signaling a
decrease in power over the course of the trial.
A further criterion for a neural accumulator is that the peak of
the accumulation should be reached later on trials with longer
reaction times (O’Connell et al., 2012). To examine this, we
compared the activity in our areas of interest between three
different reaction time bins, where short trials were defined as
reaction times under 900 ms, and long trials as reaction times
over 1700 ms (Figure 7). In the theta band, in both areas it is
clear that the ramps peak at exactly the same moment regardless
of response time. In the delta band, the exact timing of the return
to baseline is somewhat different for different reaction time bins,
but none of them show a ramp that continues all the way up to
the response for all three bins.
If this ramping signal triggers a response, the amplitude at
which it peaks should correspond to the decision threshold
so this peak magnitude should be independent of response
time (O’Connell et al., 2012). Our neural ramps do not seem to
stop at the same level in all cases. Instead, in the areas where ramp
duration scales somewhat with response time (delta power in BAs
1, 2, 3 & 5, and 37), the peak amplitude for longer trials is much
higher than for short trials. To a lesser extent, the same holds true
for theta power in BAs 19 and 37.
A surprising finding was that Brodmann areas 1, 2, 3 & 5
and Brodmann area 9 showed qualitatively different responses to
face and letter trials, only showing an accumulation-like process
in one of them (in face trials for BAs 1, 2, 3, & 5 for face
trials, and in BA 9 for letter trials), whereas the response to the
other stimulus type looks fairly random. Based on theories of
evidence accumulation, we were looking for a domain-general
accumulator (Ho et al., 2009), which is independent of the type
of stimuli being processed. Indeed, the other three band–area
pairs we found all showed very similar responses to face and
letter trials. While BAs 1, 2, 3 & 5, and 9 were also identified
as accumulators in the combined analysis, they showed very
different responses to the two types of stimuli, only showing the
characteristic gradual move away from baseline for one stimulus
type. A direct comparison of these responses for all reaction times
combined can be seen in Figure S1.
Our next criterion was that the ramping activity in our
candidate accumulators should be modulated by decision
evidence. The DDM predicts that on more difficult trials, where
the evidence is less clear, the rate of evidence accumulation
will be lower. Conversely, if our neural ramps represent
evidence accumulation, they should be steeper during easier trials
(e.g., Donner et al., 2009). We manipulated decision evidence
with summed similarity (see Materials and Methods) and list
length.
The manipulation of decision evidence with summed
similarity was only possible for face trials, and since Brodmann
area 9 did not show clear ramping during face trials, we only show
results for the other two areas where we found ramp-like delta-
band activity: BAs 1, 2, 3 & 5, and 37. As can be seen in Figure 8,
neither of these two areas show a consistent scaling of activity
with the amount of available decision evidence.
Similarly, we also compared trials of different list lengths for
both face and letter trials, as another manipulation of evidence
strength. Again, none of the signals identified by our LME-model
show a systematic decrease in slope from easy to difficult trials.
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FIGURE 6 | Correlation of regressors with 2–4 Hz delta (A) and 4–9 Hz theta (B) activity for each Brodmann area. HC, hippocampus; 1–5, Brodmann areas
1, 2, 3 & 5; 4,6, Brodmann areas 4 & 6. Ideally, neural accumulator candidates should have a higher correlation with the ramp regressor (blue) than with the downramp
(green) and boxcar (red) regressors.
4. DISCUSSION
In this study, we set out to find whether neural correlates
of evidence accumulation can be observed in the brain
during two-alternative forced choice decisions about recognition
of remembered stimuli, and if they are similar to what
has previously been found in perceptual decision making
studies. Although we tried very hard, using previously-validated
methods, to find such neural accumulators, we could not
find them. We observed that the amplitude of low-frequency
oscillations ramped up from probe onset until the response in
four different brain areas (Brodmann areas 1, 2, 3 & 5, 9, 19,
and 37). However, none of these signals fit our more specific
criteria for accumulators such as scaling with response time or
trial difficulty.
4.1. Potential Confounds due to Epileptic
Activity
There are several potential reasons for not finding a neural
correlate of evidence accumulation in our memory task. First,
it may be an artifact of the epilepsy in our participant sample.
Second, we may not have the correct brain coverage. Third, the
non-decision time we use to offset our hypothesized signal may
be incorrect. We will discuss each of these possibilities in turn.
In this study, our participants were not the healthy 18–
25 year old college students who often participate in research
studies (Henrich et al., 2010). Instead, our participants were
patients of different ages and educational backgrounds, who
suffer from severe epilepsy. It may seem reasonable to attribute
the absence of results to their pathology. However, we have taken
extensive measures to remove epileptic artifacts from our data,
and the participants included in our study all performed the task
well. In addition, our analysis only included Brodmann areas that
we measured in multiple participants. Hence we believe that the
signals we report here are representative of activity in healthy
brains.
The fact that patients participated voluntarily between
medical treatments meant that some patients were not able to
perform as many trials as others. When time courses of activity
are separated into several difficulty or reaction time bins, this
means that some patients contribute only a few trials per bin. As
a result, these time courses are quite noisy, and it is possible that
this noise obscures existing effects of reaction time or difficulty.
However, if this were the case, one would expect to see at least a
trend, and even this is not present in most of the areas we looked
at. As a result, we doubt if additional trials would have led to any
more clearcut effects in these cases.
4.2. Coverage of Brain Areas
Since the placement of electrodes was entirely based on medical
considerations, we were not able to ensure equal coverage of
all brain areas. As can be seen in Figure 2, especially frontal
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FIGURE 7 | Time course of normalized power for short (blue; RT < 900 ms), medium (green; 900 < RT < 1700 ms) and long (red; RT > 1700 ms) reaction
time (RT) bins. Left panels show face trials, right panels show letters. Top rows: 2–4 Hz delta power; (A) Brodmann areas 1, 2, 3 & 5; (B) Brodmann area 9;
(C) Brodmann area 37. Bottom row: 4–9 Hz theta power; (D) Brodmann area 19; (E) Brodmann area 37. Vertical lines represent probe onset (black) and response
(blue, green, and red). Plots are vincentized: individual trials have been resampled to a single duration to facilitate averaging over trials of different lengths.
FIGURE 8 | Time course of normalized power for different levels of decision evidence (summed similarity). (A) 2–4 Hz delta power in Brodmann areas 1, 2,
3 & 5; (B) 2–4 Hz delta power in Brodmann area 37. Vertical lines represent probe onset and response. Plots are vincentized such that individual trials are resampled
to a single duration to facilitate averaging over trials of different lengths.
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and parietal cortex were not completely covered. This includes
several areas where one might expect evidence accumulation
to be found. Examples are parts of parietal cortex such as
intraparietal sulcus, previously found to respond to strength of
evidence in a perceptual decision task (Heekeren et al., 2008),
anterior cingulate cortex, which is well-known to be involved
in decision making (e.g., Cohen et al., 2007), or posterior
cingulate cortex, which was also identified by Heekeren et al.
(2006) as a possible neural accumulator. We cannot rule out
that these areas would have shown the signal that we were
looking for.
Nevertheless, we did have data from several other areas
that have been named as sites of evidence accumulation in
previous studies, and would therefore also be expected to exhibit
neural correlates of accumulation. As described above, single-
unit studies in monkeys have identified the lateral intraparietal
area and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (corresponding to BA’s 7
and 9), among others, as neural accumulators. In humans, Ploran
et al. (2007) used fMRI to investigate which role different
brain areas play in different sub-processes of perceptual decision
making. They identified a series of accumulator areas that
integrate evidence over time, including Brodmann areas 7, 9, 19,
and 37 and several other areas we also measured. In addition, in
our previous perceptual decision making study, we also found
a signature of evidence accumulation in parietal and occipital
electrodes in scalp EEG (van Vugt et al., 2012), likely coming
from areas that we also measured in the current experiment.
It is striking that even in these areas, we did not find a clear
signature of evidence accumulation anywhere in our current
experiment. Moreover, preliminary findings from a follow-up
study using scalp EEG also did not show any neural signature
of evidence accumulation using the same methodology in a
similar face recognition task. Taken together, this makes it
more likely that the specific linear ramping pattern we were
looking for simply is not present in the brain during such
a task.
4.3. Potential Artifacts of Correcting for
Non-Decision Time
In the analysis described above, the duration of the ramp
regressor on each trial was equal to the duration of that
trial minus that participant’s estimated non-decision time, with
non-decision time being distributed equally before and after
the ramp. We chose this approach because both before and
after the accumulation process, the decision window likely also
includes some other processes, such as stimulus processing
and response preparation. However, to examine to what extent
shortening the ramps influenced our results, we performed
the same analysis with ramps that spanned the entire period
from probe onset to response. In this case, the LME model
again identified significant ramping in theta oscillations in
Brodmann areas 19 and 37, but also in theta oscillations in
BA 7 and, instead of low-frequency oscillations, in the high
gamma (48–90 Hz) band in BA 9. We also looked at event-
related activity in these two additional band-area pairs, but again,
there was no evidence of scaling with response time or trial
difficulty. Therefore, we chose not to show these results in more
detail here.
4.4. What Does the Ramping Activity
Reflect?
Although the ramping activity we observed did not show all
the predicted characteristics of evidence accumulation, it is
significantly time-locked to the decision period of our task.
This leaves the question of what role this activity plays in the
decision process. The theta activity in occipito-temporal areas
19 and 37, we believe, is most probably related to processing
the stimulus on the screen. Such a sensory process is likely to
be triggered by stimulus onset and independent of response
time (Ploran et al., 2007), just like the theta activity we observe
in these areas (Figure 7, bottom row). As for somatosensory
and prefrontal cortex (Figure 7, top row), the ramping up
of low-frequency oscillations there may reflect “tuning in” to
the sensory evidence coming from posterior areas (perhaps
communicated via delta oscillations in BA37, which show a time
course very similar to BAs 1, 2, 3, and 5). The subsequent return
to baseline, sometimes long before the response is executed,
may reflect a shift away from this communication with visual
areas and back to a more internal focus, reflecting the fact that
the influence of new incoming visual evidence on a decision
becomes smaller and smaller as more evidence has already been
collected.
4.5. Implications
Of course, this leaves open the question where the final step
of evidence accumulation which actually triggers the response,
takes place. There are several possible explanations for our
failure to find a neural signature of this process in this
study.
First of all, it is possible that a linear, monotonic evidence
accumulation process like the one represented by our ramps
takes place in this task, but our recordings failed to capture it.
As described above, using intracranial EEG has had drawbacks
with regard to the coverage of different brain areas and the
number of trials that could be collected, but we believe that if
such a process took place, we would nevertheless have observed
(part of) it.
Another possibility is that there simply is no evidence
accumulation during a memory task, and memory-based
decisions are made by a completely different mechanism than
perceptual decisions. It would be far too soon to draw such a
conclusion at this point. Moreover, it does not seem likely that
the brain would have evolved completely separate mechanisms
for these two very similar types of decisions.
Instead, the most likely conclusion is that there is evidence
accumulation in the brain during this task, but it does not
match the assumptions we made in our analysis. For example,
the ramping up of activity from probe onset to decision may
not be linear when evidence is not presented in a gradual
way, or activity may not return to baseline right after the
response as we predicted. If this were the case, our current
analysis method would not pick up such a process. To
investigate this possibility, future studies should make fewer
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assumptions about the time course of evidence accumulation
in a memory task. Instead of looking for a specific time
course of activity, it may be better to first look for brain areas
that are sensitive to the amount of evidence for a decision
and then let the data show how this activity develops over
time.
4.6. Data Sharing
The raw iEEG data are available on http://memory.psych.upenn.
edu/Request_EEG_access?paper=vanVEtal12.
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